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ABSTRACT
Theevidence presented in this study confirms that tax-induced changes in
the profitability of investment have had a powerful effect on the share of GNP
devoted to nonresidential fixed investment. More specifically, we have
reestimated two models of aggregate investment initially presented in
Feldstein, "Inflation, Tax Rules and Investment: Some Econometric Evidence,"
(Econometrica, 1982). The present study extends the previous analysis by
using revised national income accounts, by improving the estimation of the
effective tax rate and the profitability of new investments, and by extending
the sample to include the years 1978 through 1984. Despite these changes, the
new statistical estimates are remarkably close to the previous results. The
statistical estimates are also very robust with respect to sample period,
estimation method, and the presence of other variables.
The first model relates the investment-GNP ratio to the real net-of-tax
rate of return received by the providers of debt and equity capital to the
nonfinancial corporate sector and to the rate of capacity utilization. Our
estimates imply that each percentage point increase in the real net return
raises the investment-GNP ratio by 0.4 percentage points. A one percentage
point increase in the net return is equivalent to a ten percentage point
reduction in the overall effective tax rate. Since the net nonresidential
fixed investment averaged 3 percent of GNP during the past three decades, a
ten percentage point tax reduction induces a 13 percent rise in the
investment-GNP ratio.
Our second model relates the investment-GNP ratio to the difference
between the maximum potential net return that firms can support by investing
in a "standard investment project" and the net cost of debt and equity
capital. The statistical estimates imply that each percentage point change in
this measure of the rate of return over cost raises the investment-GNP ratio
by 0.3 percentage points or 10 percent of its three-decade average.
The estimates imply that the 1985 tax bill passed by the House of
Representatives would reduce the investment-GNP ratio by between 10 percent
and 15 percent of its verage value, depending on the model used to make the
calculation. Such reductions would represent between one-half and
three—fourths of the rise in the investment-GNP ratio since the 1981
investment incentives were adopted.
Martin Feldstein Joosunci Jun
National Bureau of Economic National Bureau of Economic
Research Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 1050 MassachusettsAvenue
Cantridge, W02138 Carrbridge, W 02138February 28, 1986
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THE EFFECTS OF TAX RULES ON NONRESIDENTIAL FIXED INVESTMENT:
SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE 1980S
Martin Feldstein and Joosung Jun*
By the end of the 1970s there was widespread agreement that the rate of
capital accumulation in the United States was too low and that the tax system
was an important reason for that low rate of investment. Net fixed
nonresidential investment had fallen to only 2.7 percent of GNP in the second
half of the 1970s, one-third less than it had been a decade earlier. The tax
system depressed the return to saving and to investing in business plant and
equipment by a combination of corporate and personal taxes that took 67
percent of the pretax return to capital in the nonfinancial corporate sector
during the years 1975 to 1979.1 The sharp increase in this effective tax rate
between the 1960s and 1970s was due in large part to the interaction between
the rising rate of inflation and the persistence of tax rules that base
depreciation on the nominal value of capital assets and that tax artificial
*Martin Feldstein is the George F. Baker Professor of Economics at
Harvard University and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Joosung Jun -is a graduate student at Harvard University and a research
assistant at the National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper was
prepared as part of the NBER Study of the Effects of Taxation on Capital
Formation and was presented at the NBER conference on February 14th, 1986.
1A similar measure of the combined corporate-personal tax burden was first
derived by Feldstein and Summers (1979) and is updated -in Appendix A below on
the basis of revised data and an improved procedure.—2-
nominal inventory profits and nominal capital gains.2
Congress and the new Reagan administration responded to this problem by
enacting the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981. For individual
taxpayers, this legislation stimulated saving by reducing all statutory tax
rates by 25 percent and extending eligibility for Individual Retirement
Accounts to all employees in a way that that permits the majority of
individuals to be taxed on a consumption tax basis with all of their saving
done out of pretax income. For corporations, ERTA replaced the previous
system of depreciation allowances with a simplified "Accelerated Cost Recovery
Systemt' that substantially increased the present value of depreciation
allowances. Most purchases of equipment could be depreciated over an
accelerated 5-year schedule while structures could be depreciated over 15
years using a 175 percent declining balance schedule. ERTA also provided for
further accelerations in depreciation schedules in 1985 and 1986. According
to calculations presented in The Budget of the United States for Fiscal
Year 1986, ,theoriginal ERTA provisions would have reduced 1988 corporate
tax receipts by $55 billion or 56 percent of currently projected corporate tax
receipts for that year.3
The reduction in the rate of inflation also reduced the effective rate of
tax on corporate sector capital income. The rate of increase of the GNP
deflator reached a peak of 9.6 percent in 1981 and then fell to 6 percent in
2Feldstein (1983a) contains several papers that discuss this interaction
of inflation, tax rules and capital formation.
3me Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1986 projected corporate
tax receipts of $99 billion in 1988 under current law and indicated that the
original ERTA provisions would, on the basis of 1985 economic projections, have
reduced 1988 corporate receipts by $55 billion. See pages 4-2 and 4-7 of Office
of Management and Budget (1985).-3-.
1982 and to less than 4 percent for each of the next three years. Under the
ERTA tax rules, a decline in the inflation rate from 10 percent to 4 percent
raises the present value of depreciation deductions and investment tax credits
per dollar of equipment investment from 45.2 cents to 49.2 cents.4 In
addition, the combination of lower inflation and the voluntary shift from FIFO
to LIFO inventory accounting reduced the inventory valuation adjustment from
$43 billion a year in 1979 and 1980 to only $6billion by 1984.
In short, the 1981 tax legislation and the reduction in inflation
provided a very substantial increase in the incentive to invest in plant and
equipment. But within a year there was enough concern about the prospective
deficits that Congress and the Administration passed a new tax bill aimed at
raising substantial revenue. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
(TEFRA) of 1982 introduced a half—basis adjustment for the investment tax
credit and repealed the prospective further accelerations in the depreciation
schedule. These changes implied a $43 billion rise in the 1988 corporate tax
receipts, effectively cancelling 78 percent of the reduction granted in ERTA.5
Two years later, the Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) of 1984 raised projected
1988 taxes by an additional $10 billion, leaving the net 1988 corporate tax
4mis assumes a 4 percent real discount rate. With a 10percent real
discount rate, the corresponding present value rises from 41.8 cents to
45.2 cents. With the slower depreciation rules of the pre—ERTA tax law, the
increases are greater: from 41.2 cents to 46.2 cents with a 4 percent real
discount rate and from 37.2 cents to 41.2 cents with a 10 percent real
discount rate. These figures are figures are taken from
The Economic Report of the President for 1983.
58y contrast, the 1988 personal tax increases in TEFRA were only $19
billion or 8 percent of the original ERTA personal tax reductions. These
figures are from The Budget of the United States for Fiscal Year 1986.-4-
reduction from all of the 1980s tax legislation at only $4 billion.
Although the 1982 and 1984 tax bills eliminated essentially all of the
previously enacted reduction in corporate tax liabilities, some improvement in
the incentive to invest remained for most corporations. For example, 5—year
property has depreciation deductions and an investment tax credit with a
combined present value of 45.2 cents per dollar of investment under TEFRA
(with 4 percent inflation and a 7 percent real discount rate), down from
47.1 cents under ERTA but up from 43.5 cents under the pre-ERTA rules. The
decline in inflation was also important -in reducing the overall effective tax
rate. With a 10 percent inflation, the present value of the depreciation and
investment tax credits was 39.0 percent under pre-ERTA rules and 41.8 cents
under TEFRA rules. Thus, the shift from an environment with 10 percent
inflation and pre-ERTA rules to 4 percent inflation and TEFRA rules raised the
present value of depreciation and the investment tax credit from 39.0 cents to
45.2 cents with 1.7 cents of the increase due to the change -in tax rules and
the remaining 4.5 cents due to the fall in inflation. Finally, the reductions
-in personal tax rates and -in the artificial inflation tax on capital gains
reduced the personal part of the overall tax wedge between the pretax return
to corporate capital and the net return received by the providers of debt and
equity capital.
Any analysis of the effects of these tax changes on investment must
recognize that other potentially important determinants of invest were also
changing during the same period. The economy slipped into two back-to-back
recessions beginning in the second quarter of 1980 from which it did not begin
to emerge until the final quarter of 1982. The tight monetary policy in 1981—5-
and the sharp increase in projected structural deficits in the federalbudget
caused an unprecedented rise in real interest rates that began in 1981.
Investment in particular -industries and assets was substantially affectedby
the dramatic surge in the U.S. merchandise trade deficit whichsharply
reduced output -in particular industries even while the overalleconomy was
expanding. A surge of technical change in computers and related office
equipment boosted the demand for those products even among firms that were not
doing any investment to expand capacity.
All of these changes mean that the research presented here must be
regarded as preliminary. Additional years of data will help to reduce the
remaining uncertainty, especially if the fall in real interest rates and in the
cost of equity capital continues. Disaggregated data can also help to resolve
questions about the special factors that raise or reduce investments in
particular industries and types of assets.
The simplest and most direct interpretation of the evidence developed -in
the present paper is that net fixed nonresidential investment increased
substantially in the first half of the 1980s as a result of the improved tax
climate for investment that resulted from the 1981 tax legislation and from the
reduced rate of inflation. The ratio of net fixed nonresidential investment to
GNP rose from from 0.027 in the second half of the 1970s and 0.030 in 1980 to
0.037 in 1984 and 0.040 in the first three quarters of 1985. The
investment—GNP ratio for these two years was exceeded in only fiveyears in
the preceding three decades (1965-69).
The rise in investment is consistent with the implications of two
previously formulated simple models of investment behavior that were developedand estimated in Feldstein (1982). The first model relates the ratio of net
investment to GNP to lagged values of the capacity utilization rate and of the
real net-of-tax return to the providers of debt and equity capital. In the
second model, the real net return is replaced by the rate of return over cost
(i.e., the difference between the maximum return that firms can afford to pay
to providers of debt and equity capital and the actual cost of funds). The
latter model also implies that the increase in investment in recent years
would have been significantly greater if the rise in the level of the real
interest rates had not substantially increased the cost of funds to corporate
borrowers.
The estimation of two very different models of investment behavior
deserves an extra word of comment. As Feldstein (1982) pointed out, all
models are "false" in the sense that they involve substantial simplifications
that could in principle cause significant biases in the estimated
coefficients. The only way to draw reliable inferences is to make alternative
estimates that are likely to be subject to different biases. These different
estimates may involve different types of data (the biases -in time series
analysis are different from the biases in cross-section analysis) or different
models of specifications. If the different analyses have similar
implications, the conclusions can be held with greater confidence and we are
spared the difficult problem of choosing among false models. Fortunately,
that is the case in the current study.
The econometric evidence presented -in sections 3 and 4 of this paper
incorporates data for 1979 through 1984 as well as revised data for earlier
years to reestimate the two models of investent behavior that were previously—7—
estimated with data through 1978 (Feldstein, 1962). The new estimates confirm
the previous findings, showing that the parameter estimates are quite stable
and robust to data revisions and to changes in the sample period.
The present paper also estimates several modifications of these two basic
investment models. The first alternative replaces the return net of all taxes
with the return net of only those taxes collected at the corporate level. This
return net of corporate taxes measures the return available to pension funds
and other tax exempt shareholders. It is also plausibly a better determinant
of investment behavior because changes in taxes at the level of the portfolio
investor affect the net return to alternative investments in a comparable way.
The statistical evidence shows that this model explains past variations in
investment about as well or perhaps slightly better than the original
net-of-all-taxes rate of return.
Section 1 of the paper presents a brief discussion of the behavior of
investment during the past three decades with particular attention to the
period since 1979. Section 2 then provides summary data on the basic
determinants of investment, including variations in capacity utilization and
in the various rate of return and cost of funds variables. It also presents
an overview of the results and implications of the econometric estimates of
the basic investment models. The third section then discusses the net return
model in more detail and presents the estimated regression equations. Section
4 presents parallel evidence for the return over cost model. There is a brief
concluding section that points to several directions for additional research.-8-
1.VARIATIONS IN NET NONRESIOENTIAL FIXED INVESTMENT
The analysis of this paper focuses on the ratio of net nonresidential
fixed investment to GNP. Table 1 presents averages of this ratio for five year
periods between 1955-59 and 1980—84 and annual data for the years 1979 through
1985.6
Table 1: Ratios of Investment to GNP














*Data for 1985 refers to the first 3 quarters only at a seasonally
adjusted annual rate.
The distinction between net and gross -investment is an important one. A
comparison of the two columns of Table 1 shows that the ratio of gross
6The data in Table 1 and all other data presented and used in thispaper
are based on the national income and product accounts (NIPA) available in the
fall of 1985. The December 1985 benchmark revisions of the national income and
product accounts are not reflected in any of the current analysis since
information on the net capital stock, net investment, and other key variables
was not available by the end of 1985. The data for 1985 refer to only the
first three quarters of the year since data for the fourth quarter is not
available on the old NIPA basis.-9-.
investment to net investment has been rising since the mid—1960s. Feldstein
(1983b) showed that capital consumption absorbed a growing share of gross
investment over this period for three reasons: the ratio of the capital stock
to GNP increased; the share of equipment in the capital stock rose (which
raises capital consumption because equipment depreciates more rapidly than
structures); and the nature of the equipment shifted to more rapidly
depreciating types of assets. These forces were powerful enough to maintain
gross investment at a constant share of GNP from the mid-1960s through the
late 1970s even though the net investment ratio declined by nearly one-third.
Net investment is the economically important concept because it is net
investment that determines the growth of the nation's capital stock. From a
behavioral point of view, however, specifying investment behavior in terms of
net investment is clearly a simplification since it assumes that firms invest
only -in order to achieve a desired capital stock and ignores the special
character of investments made for modernization and cost reduction.7
The data in Table 1 show that net nonresidential fixed investment has
averaged only 3.0 percent of GNP during the three decades from 1960 through
1984. The period began with investment at an even lower level of only about
2.5 percent of GNP, a condition that contributed to the Kennedy tax bill and
the introduction of the investment tax credit. Net investment rose to over 4
percent of GNP in the second half of the 1960's and then declined to 3.4
7There is a substantial literature on replacement and modernization
investment. (See Feldstein and Rothchild (1974), Feldstein and Foot (1971), and
the work cited in those papers.) This specification of investment in terms of
achieving a desired net capital stock has, of course, been characteristic of
most modern econometric research on investment; see, for example, Jorgenson
(1963), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Nickell (1968), Abel (1980,84), and Summers
(1981).-lo
percentof GNPinthe first half of the 1970s and only 2.7 percent of 0LP in
the second half of the decade. In the lGSOs, investment was initially 3ut
ligtly above 3 percent of GNP, then decined during 1982 and 1983 to only
2.2percent before risng to 3 .7 percent ot GNFin1984 ann .0 penoetot6NP
in 1985. At 4.0percentofON?,:he198flevel ofnet investment was only
exceeded orequalledin four otheryearsduring the past threedecades and
alwaysat a time when the level of capacity utilizatHon was substantially
higher than it was in 1985.
The models estimated and discussed in this paper' relate the net
investmentratio to lagged capacity utilization and to alternative measures of
the profitability of investing in nonresidential fixed capital. As we noted
above, there are of course a great many other specific Factors that can
influence the rate of investment in any period. Bosworth (1984)has
emphasized that the growth of automobile leasing companies and rapid
technological progress in computers caused a rapid rise in both types of
investments in the 1980s and that when both of these are eliminated there is
no increase in gross investment relative to ONP.°
Although this statistical fact is arithmetically correct, it is difficult
to know what economic importance it has. Just as there were special
exogenous reasons for a surge of investments in autos and computers in these
years, there were also reasons for unusually low rates of investment in
certain other industries. The early 1980s were characterized by an
unprecedented 70 percent rise in the real value of the dollar and a sharp
88osworth' sanalysis must bedone in terms of gross 1 nvestmert because the
DepartmentofCommerce does not produce data on net investment in autos and in
computers.—11--
increase in real long-term interest rates to levels that had not been seen
for a half-century. The result was a lopsided recovery in which industries
exposed to international competition and interest sensitive industries
actually contracted while the economy as a whole was expanding. By the end of
1983, many of those industries had still not reached the level of output that
they had experienced five years earlier. Even at the end of 1984, thee were
still a number of industries producing at less than their 1978 levels of
output. For such industries, there was clearly far less reason to expand
capacity.
More specifically, although real GNP rose 3.7 percent between 1979 and
1983, almost all of the increase was in the production of services. The
output of services rose $52.5 billion (in 1972 dollars) while the output of
goods rose only $10.9 billion and the output of structures actually fell by
$8.1 billion. Thus services rose 9.2 percent while the output of goods rose
only 1.6 percent. Since the services sector is less capital intensive than
the goods producing sector, this very substantial shift in the composition of
GNP would in itself tend to reduce the rate of investment.
Similarly, although overall industrial production rose by 3.3 percent
during those years, production in the primary metals industries in December
1983 was 25 percent below the 1978 level. Production of iron and steel was 35
percent below the level in 1978. Production of fabricated metal products was
13 percent below its 1979 peak level and auto production was down 11 percent.
Others with less output in December 1983 than 5 years earlier included mining,
construction, apparel, consumer home goods, and agriculture. Of these, only
autos and consumer home goods had passed their 1978-79 output levels by the
end of 1984.—12—
In short, although unusual technical progress in the computer industry
may have stimulated aggregate investment in the first half of the 1980s, the
unusual character of the recovery caused by the unprecedented rise in the
dollar and in real long-term interest rates may have depressed overall
investment. The failure to extend the statistical models of investment
behavior to include variables that adequately measure these influences may
cause the resulting estimates of the rate of return variables to be biased.
The magnitude of the potential bias depends on the relative importance for
investment of the omitted factors and the extent to which the they are
correlated with the rate of return variables. A priori, it is not possible to
determine whether the net effect of omitting both types of variables is to
overstate or understate the effect of the rate of return variable. Bosworth's
(1985) procedure of excluding the computer investments of the last few years
without making a parallel adjustment for the adverse effects of the unbalanced
recovery is clearly misleading and inappropriate. Its net effect is to
understate any positive effect on investment of the recent changes in tax
rules and the increase in net profitability.
2.AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS
The next two sections of this paper and the appendix will describe the
data and econometric estimates 'in detail. Before turning to that analysis,
the current section provides an overview of the results.
Five-year averages for the past three decades are presented for each of
the alternative measures of net return as well as for capacity utilization—13—
and for the investment-GNP ratio. Annual data are also presented for the
years 1979 through 1985. Inspection of these data show the empirical
relationships that the regression equations subsequently estimate with annual
observations.
We also combine these data with the regression coefficients estimated later
in the paper to answer three questions: (1) How well do theregression
coefficients estimated on the basis of data for the past three decadesexplain
the behavior of investment in the 1980s? (2) More specifically, how has the
change in tax rules affected the rate of investment? (3) How would prospective
investment be affected by the tax changes implied by the Administration'sMay
1985 plan and by the tax bill that passed the House of Representatives in
December 1985?
The analysis begins with the net return models and then examines the
return over cost models.
2.1 Investment and the Net Rate of Return
The basic data summarizing the relation between net investment and the
net rate of return on corporate sector capital are presented in Table 2.
Column 1 repeats the investment-GNp ratios previously shown in Table 1.The
second column presents the capacity utilization rate, a fundamental
determinant of fluctuations in investment.9 Since studies generally indicate
9The variable in column 2 is the Federal Reserve Board'smeasure of the
capacity utilization rate in manufacturing industry. The more general Total
Industry capacity utilization rate would in principle be a better variable for
the present purpose but was never constructed for the years before 1967.
Feldstein (1982) showed that additional variables measuring fluctuations in
demand (e.g., past changes in sales, available retained earnings or cashf low,
or the rate of unemployment) do not increase the explanatory power of
investment equations of the type studied here when the manufacturing capacity
utilization rate is already included. Similar evidence for the more recent
sample is presented below.—14-
a lag that peaks at 12 to 18 months between changes in the determinants of
investment and subsequent changes -in investment, the capacity utilization
variable and the other variables in Table 2 are shown with a one year lag; thus
capacity utilization for 1955-59 actually refers to the average capacity
utilization rate in the period 1954-58. It is clear that periods of high
capacity utilization tended to be periods of high net investment. But even
with the one year lag there -is a problem of simultaneity in interpreting this
association; anything that raises the investment-GNP ratio during a period of
several years will also raise the capacity utilization rate during that
period. This causes the estimated investment equations to understate the
importance of profitability and tax variables relative to capacity
utilization.
The starting point for calculating the net of tax rate of return variable
is the pretax return on nonfinancial corporate capital. We construct this as
the ratio of profits (with economic depreciation and an inventory evaluation
adjustment) before all state and local taxes plus net interest payments to the
value of the corresponding corporate capital stock at replacement cost.'°
To obtain the net rate of return (RN), we subtract from this the ratio of
the taxes paid by the corporations, their shareholders and their creditors to
the capital stock. The calculation of the tax liabilities of shareholders and
100ur calculation of the pretax return to capital follows the basic procedure
of Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks-Mireaux (1983), but several improvements have





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































creditors takes into account the distribution of debt and equity income among
different types of taxpayers (individuals by income class, pensions and other
tax exempt institutions, insurance companies, banks, etc.); details of the
calculation are presented in appendix A.
A high value of the net return on nonfinancial corporate capital should
make this type of investment more attractive relative to other uses of funds
like owner—occupied housing, government debt, real estate partnerships, ard
overseas investment. A comparison of columns 4 and 1 shows that there has been
a strong association between the variations in this net return and the
concurrent variations in the investment GNP ratio. The net return was highest
in the second half of the 1960s (6.0 percent) when the investment GNP ratio was
highest and lowest in the second half of the 1970s (2.8 percent) when the
investment—GNP ratio was lowest. During the first half of the 1980s, the
annual values of RN rose to a quite strong 5.4 percent, roughly paralleling
the rise in the investment-GNP ratio.11
The fluctuations in the net rate of return reflect not only tax rules but
also movements in pretax profitability over the business cycle and more
generally. Column 6 presents a cyclically adjusted net rate of return (RNA)
obtained by multiplying one minus the effective tax rate by a cyclically—adjusted
pretax return calculated by regressing the pretax return on the rate of
capacity utilization and then evaluating the return that would prevail at a
constant capacity utilization rate. For the five year periods, there is
11Recall that all variables -in columns 2 through 9 refer to one year
earlier; thus the real net return reached 0.054 in 1984.-16-
little difference between the cyclically adjusted returns of column 6 and the
unadjusted returns of column 4 although cyclical adjustment does lower the
1965-69 return and raise the 1980—84 return. Cyclical adjustment is more
important with the annual data and shows that the cyclically adjusted net
return rose steadily from 2.1 percent for 1981 to 5.6 percent for 1985. The
important implication of these figures is that they indicate that the close
association between the investment-GNP ratio and the real net rate of return
do not merely reflect cyclical fluctuations in profitability but are based on
changes in effective tax rates and persistent changes in pretax
profitability.
Column 5 presents an alternative measure of net profitability that
subtracts only those taxes paid by corporations to the federal government and
to state and local governments. We label the resulting variable RNC to denote
that it is the return net of corporate taxes. Taxes paid by individuals and
other portfolio investors are ignored. There are two possible reasons for
preferring this RNC variable to the return net of all taxes (RN). First, for
a very important class of investors, including pension funds and foreign
investors, only the corporate tax is relevant. The return after corporate
taxes governs the net return that they can earn as portfolio investors and
therefore their willingness to direct their assets into nonfinancial corporate
capital. Second, for taxable individual investors, the changes in personal
tax rates that affect the ultimate net return on corporate capital (RN) also
affect the net return on competing investments. The link is not complete
because the RN variable reflects the specific ownership of debt and equity
securities, the taxation of real and nominal capital gains, and other features—17--
that are specific to the return on nonfinancial corporate capital. But
fluctuations in RN induced by the changes in taxes paid by shareholders and
creditors probably exaggerates the changes in the relative desirability of
investing in nonfinancial corporate capital.
The variations in the real return net of corporate taxes (RNC) generally
parallel the shifts in the real return net of all taxes (RN) with the highest
value in the second half of the 1960s (RNC =0.077)and the lowest values in
the first have of the 1980s (RNC =0.045).The difference between the two
measures does vary from time to time, depending on the tax rules for
individuals and the rate of inflation. From 1955 through 1969, personal taxes
and other taxes paid by portfolio investors (including banks and insurance
companies) took approximately 24 percent of the return after corporate taxes
(i.e., the final net return RN was 76 percent of the the return net of
corporate taxes RNC) but this rose to 33 percent in the first half of the
1970s and 42 percent in the second half of the 1970s as inflation created high
levels of artificial nominal interest income and nominal capital gains that
were taxed to portfolio investers. By 1984, the combination of personal tax
changes and reduced inflation lowered the effective tax on portfolio investors
to about 23 percent of the return after corporate taxes.
A cyclically adjusted net return after corporate taxes (RNCA) is shown in
column 7. The five year averages of this measure show greater stability than
the other measures of net return in columns 4 through 6. Nevertheless, the
period 1965-69 continues to stand out as a time when the net return was high
and the period from 1975 through the early 1980s remains a period of low net
profitability. This measure also shows a sharp rise in net real return from—18--
4.0 percent for 1981 to 7.1 percent for 1985 (i.e., 4.0 percent in 1980 and
7.1 percent in 1984. Although this increase is not as great as the rise -in
the full net return (RNA), there was clearly a very substantial rise in net
profitability in these years that did not reflect either cyclical fluctuations
in pretax profitability or changes in personal tax rates.
2.1.1 Estimated Effects of Changes in the Net Return
Section 3 presents estimated equations relating the investment-GNP
ratio to the capacity utilization rate and to each of these four measures of
the net return. That analysis confirms that there is a strong and
statistically significant relationship between investment and the net return
in the previous year. The current estimates for the sample period 1954-84
(and for subperiods within these three decades) are very similar to the
results obtained in Feldstein (1982) with data for 1954 though 1978. The
similarity of the coefficient estimates persists even though there was a major
revision of the national income accounts in 1980 that changed much of the
earlier data and despite a number of small improvements -in the method that we
have used to calculate the net rate of return variables. The earlier analysis
did not consider the return net of corporate tax variables (RNC and RNCA) but
these are now found to explain variations in the investment ratio as well as
or better than the full net return variables (RN and RNA).
A typical example of the estimated equations implies that each percentage
point increase in the real net rate of return increases the investment—GNP
ratio by about 0.4 percentage points. The actual equation relates the
investment—GNP ratio to the net rate of return (RN) in the immediate past year—19--
and to the capacity utilization rate (UCAP) in that same past year. When this
equation is estimated with data for 1954 through 1984, the coefficient of the
net return variable is 0.41 (with a standard error of 0.12). That same
equation implies that each percentage point increase in capacity utilization
raises the investment-GNP ratio by about 0.02 percentage points.
Although these coefficients can only approximate an average relationship
over the thirty year sample period, it is interesting to see how well they
explain major shifts in the investment ratio between particular dates.
Consider first the sharp fall in investment between the high of 4.2 percent of
GNP in the 1965-69 period and the 2.7 percent of GNP a decade later, a decline
of 1.5 percent of GNP. Between these same periods the net return fell from
6.0 percent to 2.8 percent. This 3.2 percentage point decline and the
estimated coefficient of 0.4 imply a fall of 1.3 percentage points in the
investment-GNP ratio. The concurrent 8 percentage point decline -in capacity
utilization (from 88.0 percent in 1965—69 to 79.6 percent in 1975-79) and the
estimated coefficient of 0.02 imply a fall of 0.2 percentage points in the
investment-GNP ratio. Thus together the decline in the net return and in
capacity utilization imply a fall of 1.5 percentage points in the
investment-GNP ratio, exactly what was observed. More than 85 percent of this
fall was attributable to the decline in the net return.
Of course, not all movements in investment can be explained as
satisfactorily by the simple models used here. For example, investment rose
between the early 1960s and the early 1970s even though the equation would
have predicted a decline of 0.2 percent in the investment-GNP ratio. What
matters for the purpose of this study is not the ability to provide a perfect
explanation of year to year variations of investments (although =0.60indicates a quite good explanation of the volatile investment GNP ratio
w-ithout the use of long distributed lags or lagged dependent variables) but
the ability to measure the impact of tax changes on the level of investment.
The predictions of the simple net return model also fit well with the
experience of the 1980s. The investment-GNP ratio rose from 3.3 percent in the
years 1979-81 to 3.9 percent in 1984-85. The corresponding (lagged) measures
of the real net return rose from 2.6 percent to 4.8 percent, implyinga 0.9
percentage point rise in the investment—GNP ratio while the five percentage
point decline in capacity utilization implies a 0.1 percentage point fall in
the investment-GNP ratio. Thus the equation predicts a 0.8percentage point
increase in the investment-GNP ratio while the actua' investment ratio
increased 0.6 percentage points. In short, investment increased slightly less
than predicted on the basis of the stronger investment incentive as measured in
this way.12
It is interesting to decompose the effect of the change in the net return
during these years -into the effect of the change in tax rules and the effect
of the change in the pretax rate of return. The effective tax rate declined
from 69.0 percent in the years 1978-80 (i.e. the years relevant for investment
in 1979—81) to 47.0 percent in years 1983—84. The pretax rate of return rose
from 8.2 percent for the early years to 9.0 percent for the lateryears.If
the tax rate had remained at the 1978-80 value while the pretax returnrose,
the net of tax return (RN) would have increased by 0.25 percentage points.
12Note that comparing 1985 with 1979-81 shows a similar result. The
investment-GNP ratio rose 0.8 percentage points while the equation predicts a
rise of 1.0 percentage points.—21—
The implied increase in the investment-GNP ratio would then be 0.1 percentage
points. In contrast, if the pretax return had remained at 8.2 percent while
the effective tax rate fell from 69.0 percent to 47.0 percent, the after—tax
return would have increased by 1.8 percentage points. The implied increase in
the investment would be 0.7 percentage points. Thus the fall in the effective
tax rate was about seven times as important in stimulating a rise in
investment as the increase in the pretax rate of return. The capacity
utilization rate actually fell slightly during this period, decreasing by just
about enough (5.3 percentage points) to offset the rise in the pretax rate of
return.13 The decline in the effective tax rate is thus responsible for all of
the predicted rise in investment.
Of the initial 69.0 percent effective tax rate, 30.6 percentage points
was the federal corporate tax rate, 15.8 percentage points were state and
local profits and property taxes paid by corporations, and 22.6 percentage
points were federal and state income taxes paid by the individuals and other
providers of debt and equity capital. By 1983-84, these percentages had
declined to 17.0 percent, 14.0 percent and 16.0 percent. These figures imply
that the taxes paid by the corporations to the federal, state and local
governments fell from 46.4 percent of the real pretax return to 31.0 percent
of that return, a decline of one third in the effective tax rate at the
corporate level. The taxes paid by portfolio investors were initially 22.6
percent of the pretax return or 42.2 percent of the return that remained after
131he 5.3 percentage point decline and the estimated investment sensitivity
of 0.02 together imply a decline of 0.1 percentage points in the investment-GNP
ratio.—22--
the taxes paid by corporations. By 1983-84, this declined to 16.0percent of
the pretax return or 23.2 percent of the return that remained after the taxes
paid by the corporations, a decline of nearly one half.
To calculate what these effective tax rate declines contributed to the
predicted rise in the investment—GNp ratio, we assume that the initial
8.2 percent pretax return remains fixed for all years. As we already noted,
the decline in the overall effective tax rate implied a 1.8 percentage point
rise in the real after-tax return and therefore a 0.7 percentage point increase
in the investment-GNP ratio. Slightly less than two-thirds of this was
accounted for by the decline in the effective federal corporate tax rate: the
13.6 percentage point decline in that effective tax rate represented a
1.1 percentage point rise -in the real after-tax return and therefore an
investment-GNP rise of 0.45 percentage. points.
The model also provides a basis for making a very rough calculation of
how investment would respond to future changes in tax rules like those
proposed by the Administration in May 1985 or the ones enacted by the House -in
December 1985. The Adm-inistrations proposal would raise corporate tax
liabilities by approximately 25 percent while cutting personal taxes by about
7 percent. It is difficult to translate the personal tax changes into a
change in the effective tax rate on the interest, dividends and capital gains
arising from the earnings of nonfinancial corporations. Much of the interest
and dividend income is received by pension funds and others that are not
currently taxed and that would not be affected by the change in personal tax
rates. Although the maximum marginal tax rate on interest and dividends
received by individuals would be reduced from 50 percent to 35 percent, much—23--
of the overall reduction in personal taxes would take the form of an increase
in the personal exemption that left the tax rate on capital income unchanged.
In addition, special provisions would limit the use of 401k saving plans and
would impose heavier taxes on financial institutions. Fortunately, the
calculation -is ot very sensitive to alternative assumptions about the change
in the effective tax on individuals and other portfolio investors.
For the purpose of this calculation, we assume that the pretax rate of
return and the rate of capacity utilization would remain unchanged. Federal
corporate taxes in 1964 took 16.6 percent of the total real pretax return on
nonfinancial corporate capital. A 25 percent increase in federal corporate
liabilities would raise this to 20.6 percent. The combined federal, state and
local taxes paid by the corporations would rise from 29.6 percent to 33.8
percent of pretax capital income. The return net of corporate taxes would
therefore Fall from 70.4 percent of pretax income to 66.2 percent. Taxes on
individuals and other portfolio investors in 1984 took 21.7 percent of the net
capital income after corporate taxes. If this fraction remained unchanged, the
effect oF the modified corporate tax rates would be to reduce the final net
share of pretax capital income received by portfolio investors from
55.1 percent (that is, 76.3 percent of 70.4 percent) to 51.8 percent (i.e.,
78.3 percent of 66.2 percent.)
If the pretax rate of return is unchanged, the after tax rate of return
(RN) would fall From the 5.4 percent observed in 1984 to 5.1 percent. Since
each percentage point decline in the real net return causes a 0.4 percentage
point decline in the investment—GNP ratio, this projected decline in the net
return (from 5.4 percent to 5.1 percent) would reduce the investment GNP ratio-24-
by about 0.12 percentage points. This represents about 3 percent of the
investment level in 1984—85 and aboutone-fifthof the -increase -in investment
between 1979—81 and 1984-85.
A 5 percent increase or decrease in the tax pa-id by individual and
institutional portfolio -investors would alter this change in investment by
about one-fifth of its value. Thus an average decline of 5 percent in the
effective tax on portfolio investors (from 21.7 percent of the
after corporate tax return to 20.6 percent) would imply that the decline in the
-investment--GNP ratio would be about 2.4 percent oF the 1984-85 level or
one—sixth of the increase since 1979—81. Conversely, a rise of 5 percent in
the effective tax rate on portfolio investors (from 21.7 percent of the after
corporate tax return to 22.8 percent) would imply that the decline in the
investment-GNP ratio would be about 3.6 percent of the 1984-85 level or
one—fourth of the increase since 1979-81.
The bill passed by the House of Representatives in December 1985 would
depress investment by substantially more than the Administration proposal..
A critical difference between the two plans is that the Administration plan
calls for full indexing o-f the base for depreciation while the House version
would index the depreciation base only to the extent of half of the inflation
-in excess of 5 percent. At a 5 percent inflation rate, indexing raises the
present value of depreciation allowances in the Administration's plan by
15 percent for most types of equipment (the class 4 assets under the
Administration's plan). At a 10 percent inflation rate, fully indexed
depreciation would have a present value 22 percent higher than the
"half indexed over 5 percent" depreciation provided by the House bill.—25 -
Thedifference in indexing rules is even more important for structures.
At a 5 percent inflation rate, indexing raises the present value of
depreciation allowances for most structures by 60 percent. At a 10 percent
inflation rate, the fully indexed depreciation would have a present value that
is 84 percent higher than the half indexed over 5 percent depreciation
provided by the House bill.
The House bill is also more harmful to investment in a variety of other
ways.It would depreciate the typical equipment investment over 10 years
instead of the 7 years provided by the Administration, although at
double-declining balance rate instead of the approximately 1.5 times declining
balance rate prescribed in the Administration plan. The House also enacted a
slightly higher corporate tax rate than the Administration proposed.
Because of the lack of indexing and the difference in the timing of
depreciation, the House bill eventually raises corporate taxes by much more
than the Administration bill. Although both bills would raise corporate taxes
by about 25 percent in 1987 and 1988, by 1990 the Administration bill would
increase the corporate tax by 23 percent and the House would increase it by 37
percent. Under the House bill, corporate taxes would rise by about 50 percent
in the first half of the 1990s, twice the increase that we have assumed in
evaluating the potential impact of the Administration plan.
To evaluate the impact on investment, we again assume that the pretax
rate of return and the rate of capacity utilization are unaffected. Since
federal corporate taxes in 1984 took 16.6 percent of the total real pretax
return on nonfinancial corporate capital, the 50 percent increase implied by
the House bill would raise that to 249 percent. The combined federal, state-26-
and local taxes pa-id by the corporations would rise from 29.6 percent to 37.9
percent. Taxes on individuals and other portfolio investors in 1984 took
21.7 percent of the net capital income after all corporate taxes. If this
fraction remained unchanged, the effect of the House plan would be to reduce
the final net share of real pretax capital income received by portfolio
investors from 55.1 percent (that is 78.3 percent of 70.4 percent) to 48.6
percent (78.3 percent of 62.1 percent).
With the pretax return unchanged at 9.9 percent, the after tax return
(RN) would fall from the 5.4 percent actual value in 1984 to 4.8 percent. This
projected decline would reduce the investment-GNP ratio by 0.24 percent or
twice the decline implied by the Administration bill. This represents about
6 percent of the investment level in 1984-85 and about 40 percent of the
increase in the investment-GNP ratio between 1979—81 and 1984—85.
2.1.2 The Return Net of Corporate Taxes
These particular numerical conclusions depend on the specification of the
net return after all taxes as the key determinant of the investment-GNP ratio.
The alternative equation relating net investment to the return after corporate
taxes (RNC) implies a somewhat larger effect of the Administration's proposed
tax changes. Section 3 shows that estimates of the RNC equation imply that
each percentage point change in the net return at the corporate level shifts
the investment—cNP ratio by 0.45 percentage points. More important than the
slight increase in this coefficient is the fact that the change in the net
return at the corporate level is not diluted by subsequent portfolio
taxation.—27—
Consider the implications of this specification for the change in
effective tax rates and investment between 1979-81 and 1984-85. The effective
tax rate at the corporate level fell from 46.4 percent of the 8.2 percent
pretax return to 31.0 percent of the 9.0 percent pretax return. The return net
of the corporate tax thus rose from 4.4 percent to 6.2 percent. Multiplying
the 1.8 percentage point rise by the 0.45 investment sensitivity figure
implies a rise in the investment-GNP ratio of 0.8 percentage points. Since
the decline in the capacity utilization rate implied a 0.1 percentage point
fall in the investment-GNP ratio and the actual investment-GNP ratio rose
0.6 percentage points, the rise in the net return after the corporate tax
explains the actual movement in the investment-GNP ratio quite well.
To isolate the impact of the change in tax rates, note that if the pretax
return had remained constant at 8.2 percent, the decline in the effective tax
rate at the corporate level would have raised the return net of corporate
taxes by 1.2 percentage points and therefore increased the investment—GNP
ratio by 0.54 percentage points, almost the entire observed rise.
The estimated sensitivity of the investment-GNP ratio to the return net
of the corporate tax implies that a relatively modest increase in the
effective corporate tax rate would have a substantial impact on the investment
—GNP ratio. Thus a fall in the return net of corporate taxes from 70.4
percent of pretax income to 66.2 percent (as implied by the Administration's
tax proposal) would reduce the 1984 value of the return net of corporate taxes
from 7.0 percent (RNC =0.070)to 6.5 percent. This 0.5 percent fall in the
net rate of profit would translate into a 0.22 percentage point decline in the
investment-GNP ratio. This is a decline of nearly 6 percent of the 1984-85-28—
investment-GNP ratio and more than one third of the rise in the investment GNP
ratio from the level of 1979-81.
The fall in the return net of corporate taxes from 70.4 percent to
62.1 percent, as implied by the House bill, would reduce the 1984 value of the
return net of all corporate taxes from 7.0 percent to 6.1 percent. This
0.9 percent fall in the net rate of profit would translate into a 0.41
percentage point decline in the investment-GNP ratio. This is a decline of
11 percent of the 1984-85 irivestment-GNP ratio and three-quarters of the rise
in the investment-GNP ratio of 1979-81.
2.1.3 Relative Rates of Return
Increases in the real net return on corporate capital raise the
investment-GNP ratio by attracting funds away from alternative uses. This
suggests that the behavior of investment might be better explained and
predicted if the statistical model explicitly included the real return on
alternative assets as well as the return on investments in nonfinancial
corporate capital. The problem with doing this in practice is that there are a
wide range of alternatives to investment in corporate capital including
government debt, real estate, oil drilling and other natural resource
investments, overseas investments, owner-occupied housing, consumer durables
and other forms of consumer spending.
Moreover, as the experience of the early 1980s dramatically
demonstrated, a substantial amount of U.S. investment can be financed by an
inflow of capital from the rest of the world. The U.S. current account deficit
in 1984 was $101 billion or 2.8 percent of GNP, implying that the capitalinflow was equivalent to approximately two-thirds of all net fixed
nonresidential investment. By contrast, the United States had a current account
surplus in 1980 and invested more abroad than foreigners invested in the United
States.
The present paper makes a first step in analyzing the sensitivity of
investment to other rates of return by explicitly including the real net
return on government bonds. For this purpose, we measure the nominal return
on government bonds by the yield on 5-years Treasury bonds and calculate the
real interest rate by subtracting an estimate of the expected rate of
increase of the GNP deflator during the same five year period.14 The
difference between the real cyclically-adjusted net return to corporations
(RNCA) and the real interest rate is presented in column 9. For the real
return on corporate capital net of all taxes (RNA), the analagous comparison
is to the real net—of--tax interest rate, i.e., the net of tax nominal interest
rate minus the expected rate of inflation. For this purpose, we use the same
effective tax rate on nominal interest income that is used for the interest
component of the portfolio income generated by the nonfinancial corporate
capital. This is a weighted average of the marginal tax rates of individuals
in different tax brackets and of different types of taxable and nontaxable
financial institutions.15 The difference between the real net return
14The projected increases in inflation are taken from Feldstein (1986)
and are only available from 1960.The projected increases in inflation were
calculated by estimating a first-order autoregressive moving average process,
using it to project annual inflation for ten future years, and then taking an
average of those inflation rates.
15This series of effective tax rates on interest income is presented in
appendix table A-3.-30-
on corporate capital and the real net interest rate is shown incolumn 8 of
Table 2.
It is clear that neither measure of the relative returnon corporate
capital has moved closely with the variations in the investment-GNpratio.
Both measures showed the greatest differential in favor ofcorporate cap-i tal
in the 1975-79 period when the investment GNP levelwas actually very low.
This occurred because the very high level of actual andexpected inflation
during these years caused the real return on treasury bonds todrop to only
one percent and the real net-of-tax return on those bonds to becomenegative.
Moreover, the investment-GNp ratio rose significantly in the 1980seven though
the differential between the return tocorporate capital and to government
bonds declined because of the rise -in the real returnon government bonds.
These observations indicate that the yield differentialbetween corporate
capital and government bonds -is not a good measure of the attractivenessof
corporate investment. As we noted above, investors face a widerange of
alternative investments. Moreover, whatever the yieldon Treasury bonds, they
can only displace saving to the extent that the government deficit increases
the stock of bonds. And the recent experience shows thata combination of
high yields on government bonds and on corporate capital can at least
temporarily attract substantial funds from the rest of the world. Until a far
more complete model of the alternative to corporate capital investment is
implemented, it seems better to focus on the real net return tocorporate
capital rather than on a differential rate of return.—31—
2.2 Investment and the Rate of Return over Cost
The analysis relating investment to the net rate of return is the
simplest possible model of investment behavior. The economy is treated like a
black box in which the mechanism is obscure but which produces the plausible
result that more capital flows into nonfinancial corporate capital when the
rate of return on that type of asset is high.16
We now turn to a more explicit model of investment behavior in which
corporate demand to invest reflects the difference between the profitability
of new additions to the stock of plant and equipment and the cost of funds
with which to finance that investment. This approach, labelled the return
over cost model of investment, differs from the previous analysis in two
fundamental ways. First, the investment decision is explicitly made by the
corporation. Second, the decision reflects a comparison of the cost of funds
and the prospective yield on new marginal investments rather than the yield on
existing capital.
The return over cost model is the empirical implementation in a world of
taxes and mixed debt-equity finance of the simple textbook model in which the
rate of investment depends on the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency
of investment. To make that operational, the location of the investment
demand schedule is represented by the rate of return that the firm can afford
to pay for funds used to finance a "typical't project. This return, which we
label the maximum potential net return",17 is analogous to the internal rate of
160n the case for studying such a simple model and for examining several
alternate models rather than looking for the "true" model, see Feldstein (1982).
17The maximum potential net return was introduced in Feldstein and Summers
(1978) and used inFeldstein(1982) to explain investment behavior. A more

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































return of a project in an economy without taxes. Changes -intaxrules,
inflation and pretax profitability all alter the maximum potential net return
and therefore the incentive to invest.
More specifically, the real maximum net return is the maximum real return
that a corporation can pay to the providers of debt and equity capital on a
project that consists of both equipment and structures in a ratio that matches
the equipment-structure ratio of the nonfinancial corporate capital stock.
Two sets of calculations are presented: in one the pretax real rate of return
is fixed at 10.3 percent, the average pretax return during the period 1961 to
1984. In the other, the calculation assumes that the pretax return varies from
year to year and is equal to the then current ex post return on nonfinancial
corporate capital.
The calculations described in more detail in section 4 show that,for
example, with a pretax return of 10.3 percent, the tax rules of 1984 and an
expected inflation rate of 5.5 percent, the maximum potential real net return
that the firm could pay to the providers of capital would be 7.3 percent. The
maximum potential net return measure is "net" in the sense that it represents
the net cost that the firm can afford to pay after taking the tax deduction
for interest expenses. In 1984, the nominal interest rate on high grade
corporate debt was 12.3 percent, implying that the net-of-tax cost of debt was
6.6 percent and the real net cost of debt was 1.1 percent. The required real
return on equity capital (i.e., the ratio of economic earnings to the share
price) was however 8.4 percent. We assume that firms are forced by risk
considerations to use a mixture of two-thirds equity and one-third debt
(approximately the average ratio during the sample period) to finance their—33
investments. The weighted average real net cost of funds in 1984 was
therefore 0.33 (1.1) +0.67(8.4) =6.0percent.18
Table 3 presents summary data on the maximum potential real net return
(MPRNR) and the real net cost of funds (RCOF). For reference, the
investment-GNP ratio is presented in column 1 and the capacity utilization
rate in column 2. Column 3 shows that the changes in tax rules raised the
MPRNR between the early 1960s and the second half of that decade and that the
1981—82 changes in tax rules and the sharp fall in inflation have caused a
very substantial increase in the MPRNR since 1980.
Column 4 shows the effect of dropping the assumption of constant pretax
profitability and assuming instead that firms adjust their projected future
pretax profitability in proportion to the annual variations in observed
pretax profitability. This calculation, which obviously exaggerates the extent
to which firms react to year—to—year variations in profits, shows a much
stronger increase in the MPNR in the second half of the 1960s but much lower
values in the 1980s.
The real net cost of funds is shows in column 5 and the difference between
the maximum potential return and the cost of funds in columns 6 and 7. The real
cost of funds was relatively high in the late 1960s, was high again in the
late 1970s (when the high cost of equity outweighed the very low cost of debt)
and rose again in the 1980s because of the combination of high real interest
18Note that the maximum potential net return that a firm can afford to pay
is independent of its debt-equity ratio. In contrast, the returns that the
firm can afford to pay on debt and equity capital separately depends very much
on the debt-equity mix.-34-
rates, low inflation and relatively high equity costs.
Although the effect of the variations in the real cost of funds has been
to leave the five-year average difference between the maximum potential return
and the cost of funds almost constant, the individual annual values show
substantial variation. Column 6 shows that the difference (MPRNR-RCOF) rose
from 0.7 percent for 1979 to 2.9 percent for 1984, implying a substantial
increase in the incentive to invest.
2.2.1 Estimated Effects of Changes in the Return over Cost
The regression equations presented in section 4 relate the investment-GNP
ratio to the rate of return over cost (MPRNRCOF) in the immediate previous
year and to the capacity utilization rate in that year. The estimated
coefficient of the rate of return over cost variable implies that each one
percentage point increase in that differential raises the investment-GNP ratio
by 0.3 percentage points. The estimated equation also implies that each
percentage point increase in capacity utilization raises the investment—GNP
ratio by 0.09 percentage points.
Although these values cannot be expected to explain each short-run
fluctuation in the investment-GNP ratio, it is interesting to see what their
implications are for the recent shifts in tax policy and in the cost of funds
and to speculate about the likely effects of future changes in tax rules. The
rate of return over cost relevant for 1979-81 averaged 0.009 for and rose to
0.021 for 1984-85. The rise of 0.012 implies an increase in the investment-GNP
ratio of 0.36 percent, thereby accounting for 60 percent of the observed rise
in the investment-GNP ratio between the 3.3 percent average for 1979-81 and—35--
the 3.9 percent average for 1984-85. However, the fall in capacity
utilization between these two same dates (from 0.827 for 1979—81 to 0.774 for
1984-85) outweighed the improvement in the rate of return over cost and,
according to the statistically estimated equation, implied that the
investment-GNP ratio should have declined over the period. One possible
reason for this forecast error is that businesses in 1979 and 1980 recognized
that the high level of capacity utilization at that time was transitory
because the shift toward a tight monetary policy that began in October 1979
would inevitably bring about a substantial recession.
The experience for the 1980s as a whole also shows the offsetting effects
of an improved tax environment and the increasing cost of funds. The maximum
potential real net return rose from 6.0 percent for 1979—81 (i.e., in 1978-80)
to 7.3 percent for 1985; the increase of 1.3 percentage points implies an
increase in the investment—GNP ratio of 0.4 percentage points. But during
these same years, the real cost of funds rose from 5.1 percent to 6.0 percent,
offsetting two-thirds of the increased incentive to invest. It is interestiRg
to note that the cost of equity funds was the same for 1985 as it had been for
1979-81, implying that the entire increase -in the cost of funds was due to the
rise in the cost of debt (from a real 3.4 percent for 1979-81 to 6.0 percent
for 1985). To the extent that the increase -in the deficit in the federal
budget was responsible for this rise in the rate of interest, it had the
effect of offsetting a large part of the increased incentive to invest that
resulted from the change in tax rules and the reduction in inflation.19
19The evidence in Feldstein (1986) indicates that the rise in anticipated
budget deficits was the primary reason for the increase in real medium-term
interest rates between 1979—81 and 1984. In particular, there is no evidence
that the increase in the MPRNR raised interest rates.-36—
The relation between the investment-GNP ratio and the rate of return over
cost gives some hnt of how future fiscal policies might affect the future
investment level. According to the estimates in Feldstein (1986), a decline
of the projected budget deficit from the 4 percent of GNP prevailing in 1984
to 1 percent of GNP would reduce the real interest rate by approximately 3
percentage paints (and therefore back to its historic norm). This in turn
would lower the cost of capital by 1 percentage point if it left the cost of
equ-ity capital unchanged and by 3 percentage points if the returns on debt and
equity declined by equal amounts. The estimated relation between the
investment—GNP ratio and the rate of return over cost implies that this fall
in the cost of captal would raise the investment-GNP ratio by between 0.3
percentage points and 0.9 percentage points, an increase equal to between
10 percent and 30 percent of the average investment-GNP ratio of the past
quarter century.
The changes in the tax law that the Administration proposed in May 1985
would reduce the MPRNR by only about 0.2 percentage points at the 1984 rate of
inflation, from 7.3 percent to 7.1 percent. This decline reflects a sharper
decline for equipment and an actual increase for structures. This decline in
the rate of return over cost (assuming that the real cost of funds remained
unchanged) would reduce the investment-GNP ratio by only about 0.06 percentage
points or about 2 percent of the investment—GNP level in 1984-85. The
MPNR-COF framework thus implies only about half of the reduction in the
overall investment-GNP ratio in response to the Administration's bill as the
reduction implied by the RN and RNC calculations. In considering this
relatively small total reduction, it should be recalled that the fall in the—37--
MPNR for equipment is much more substantial so that the composition of the
overall investment would change in the direction of structures andaway from
equipment. The magnitude of this shift will be examined in a later paper
using the MPNR data disaggregated into structures and equipment.
In contrast to the small effect of the President's plan on aggregate
investment, the House bill implies that the MPRNR for 1984 would fall from
7.3 percent to 5.9 percent. If the cost of funds remained unchanged, the
resulting 1.4 percentage point decline in the rate of return over cost would
reduce the investment—GNP ratio by approximately 0.42 percentage points. This
decline is seven times larger than the decline implied by the Administration's
plan. The fall in the investment-GNP ratio would be approximately 11 percent
of the 1984-85 level of that ratio and three quarters of the rise in the
investment-GNP ratio from 1979-81 to 1984-85. This agrees almost exactly with
the decline in the investment-GNP ratio implied by the model that relates that
investment ratio to the rate of return net of taxes at the corporate level.
3. NET RETURN AND THE RATE OF INyT:TATIcALEpç
This section presents the estimated equations relating the investment-GNP
ratio to the net rate of return on the capital of nonfinancial corporations.
Appendix A describes the calculation of the pretax rate of return on that
capital and of the tax rates paid by the corporations and by the portfolio
investors that provide debt and equity capital. The Appendix also presents
the annual time series of the basic regression variables (that were summarized
in Table 2 above) and of the components of the tax rate.
Equation (3.1) reproduces the basic specification estimated in Feldstein
(1982) relating the ratio of net investment to GNP (I/Yt) to the real net-38—
rate of return in the previous year (RNt_i) and the rate of capacity
utilization (UCAPt_i). The equation is estimated with a first—order
autocorrelation correction, and the simultaneously estimated autocorrelation
coefficient is presented as the coefficient of the variable u,_1.
(3.1) I/Y. =—0.014+0.459RNt_i +0.028UCAPt i +0.29u1
(0.095) (0.025) (0.25)
=0.754,DWS =2.04,1954-78
After this equation was estimated in the summer of 1980, the Commerce
Department prepared a major data revision that substantially modified a
number of the series used to calculate each of the variables.
In addition, in preparing to reest-imate this and other equations, we have
introduced a number of improvements in the procedure used to calculate the
real net return to capital. Nevertheless, when this equation is reestimated
with the new data for the same period, the resulting parameter estimates are
very similar to those that were presented in Feldstein (1982):
(3.2) I/Y. = +0.453RNt_i +0.020UCAPt_i +0.445ut_i
(0.114) (0.025) (0.230)
=0.698,OWS =1.99,1954-78
Extending the sample through 1984 has very little affect on the estimated
coefficients:
(3.3) i!iv =-0.003+0.412RNt_i +0.021UCAPt...i +0.431ut_i
(0.116) (0.024) (0.206)
=0.598,OWS =1.92,1954-84—39—
The coefficient of the net return variable is 0.412, implying that each one
percentage point rise in RN causes the investment—GNP ratio to rise by 0.412
percentage points. The associated elasticity at the mean values of RN (0.038)
and of the investment-GNP ratio (0.030) is 0.52.
The persistently strong effect of the real net return does not reflect
the dominant effect of the early years or of any other part of the sample. When
the sample is divided in half, the effect of the real net return is quite
strong in both halves. For the period from 1954 through 1969 we obtain:
(3.4a) =-0.055+0.433RNt_i +0.079UCAPt 1 -0.565
ut_i (0.067) (0.023) (0.253)
=0.808,DWS =2,17,1954—69
The results for the second half of the sample are:
(3..4b)I/Y =-0.040+0.576RNt1 +0.065UCAPt i +0.166u1
(0.136) (0.022) (0.347)
0.611, DWS =1.79,1970—84
The coefficient of RN is actually higher in each of the sample periods
than -it is for the overall period. In particular, the evidence for the most
recent 15 years implies an effect that is nearly 40 percent stronger
than for the entire sample.
The estimated coefficients are also quite insensitive to the use of the
autocorrelation correction. When the equation is reestimated for the entire
period by ordinary least squares, the coefficient of RN shifts only from the0.41 value presented in equation (3.3) to 0.37. Even more reassuring are the
estimates obtained when the basic specification is first—differenced:
1n 1n
(35)
- = 0.0004+0.422(Rti—R t-2 +0.022(UCAPt_i—UCAPt_2)
t t—1 (0.126) (0.022)
=0.317,DWS2.45, 1955-84
The stability of these parameter estimates is certainly very impressive,
indicating that the investment-GNP ratio does respond to year-to-year
variations in RN and UCAP and not just to the broad shifts in these variables.
We have also tested the simple lag structure of the basic specification
and found that the implications about the effects of RN and UCAP are unaffected
when more general lag structures are estimated. Equation (3.6) shows that a
second lagged value of RN is not statistically significant and that the sum of







This conclusion is confirmed when the lagged values of RN are replaced by a
second—order polynomial distributed lag over four lagged values with no
restriction on the final distributed lag coefficient. The sum of the lag
coefficients is 0.419 with a standard error of 0.229. The lagged UCAP variable
has a coefficient of 0.022 with a standard error of 0.037 and the R2 value
is 0.624.
Additional lagged values of the capacity utilization variable are also-41--
insignificant and leave the coefficient of the RN variable essentially
unchanged:





More complex lag structures for UCAP, including polynomial distributed lags,
confirmed this conclusion.
We also considered a variety of alternatives to capacity utilization.
Substituting the unemployment rate among adult males left the coefficient of
RN essentially unchanged (at 0.445 with a standard error of 0.112) but was
itself insignificant (a coefficient of -0.020 with a standard error of 0.075).
Substituting a distributed lag in the percentage change in real nonf arm
business product (PCNFBP), as suggested by the traditional accelerator model,
leaves the coefficient of RN essentially unchanged.





Finally, we experimented with a number of possible additional variables
including the ratio of cashf low to GNP, the rate of inflation and a time
trend. The coefficients of these variables were not significant and the—42-
coefficient of the RN variable remained essentially unchanged. A typical







We have also reestimated the basic equation using the cyclically adjusted
net return, RNA. This variable is constructed by calculating a regression
equation relating the pretax profitability to the concurrent rate of capacity
utilization and then calculating the pretax return that would have prevailed
at a constant rate of capacity utilization. The effective tax rate is then
applied to this cyclically adjusted pretax rate of return to obtain the
cyclically adjusted net rate of return, RNA. The regression coefficient of
this variable is essentially identical to the coefficient of RN in the basic
estimate of equation (3.3):
(3.10) =—0.025+0.416RNAt_i +0.048UCAPt_i +0.422ut_i
(0.118) (0.021) (0.205)
=0.595,DWS =1.95,1954—84
Although our analysis focused on the net return after all taxes, we also
estimated the basic equations using the rate of return after corporate taxes
only. As we explained in section 2.1, the return after corporate taxes is the
appropriate measure of the attractiveness of investing in the nonfinancial—43--
corporate capital fortax exempt investors like pension funds and for foreign
investors. Looking at the return after the corporate tax is also appropriate
to the extent that changes in personal tax rates have an equal effect on the
net return to the competing investments. Equation (3.11) shows that
variations in the rate of return after corporate taxes (RNC) has a slightly
stronger effect on the investment—GNP ratio than the RN measure of the net
return:
(3.11)I/Y =-0.008+0.455RNCt i +0.016UCAPt_i +0.276u1
(0.104) (0.024) (0.221)
=0.632,DWS =1.85,1954—84
The results with the cyclically adjusted measure of the real return net
of corporate tax have almost the same coefficient of the net return variable
but a stronger effect of the capacity utilization variable:
(3.12)I/Y =—0.044+0.455RNCAt i +0.061UCAPt_i +0.240
(0.103) (0.020) (0.222)
=0.626,DWS =1.87,1954-84
In both equations, the explanatory power (R2) is greater with the RNC
variable than with the RN variable. Moreover, since the RNC and RNCA variables
are about 40 percent larger on average than the corresponding RN variables,
the elasticity of the investment-GNP ratio with respect to RNC is
approximately 0.80.
Finally, we have estimated equations describing the rate of growth of the
net capital stock, i.e., replacing the ratio of investment to GNP with the—44-
ratio of investment to the net capital stock at the end of the preceding year.
The results, shown in equation (3.13), are qualitatively very similar to the
basic investment-GNP estimates of equation (3.3):
(3.13) —= -0.21+0.608RNt1 +0.045UCAPt_I +0.138ui
K1 (0.121) (0.032) (0.241)
=0.682,DWS =1.91,1954-84
The coefficient of RN is nearly 50 percent larger than the corresponding
coefficient in the equations for the investment—GNP ratio while the
investment-capital ratio averages only about 30 percent larger than the
investment—GNP ratio. Thus the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio
with respect to RN, calculated at the mean investment-capital ratio (0.039)
and the mean value of RN (0.038) is 0.59 or somewhat greater than the
previously calculated elasticity of 0.52 of the investment-GNP ratio with
respect to RN.
4.THE RATE OF RETURN OVER COST AND THE RATE OF INVESTMENT:
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
The second basic model that we discussed above and that was developed in
Feldstein (1982) relates the investmerit-GNP ratio to the difference between
the maximum potential net return on a standard investment project and the net
cost of funds that firms face. This model is the operational extension to an
economy with taxes of Irving Fisher's (1896, 1930) notion that investment
depends on the difference betwen the marginal efficiency of capital (or the
internal rate of return on an incremental investment) and the rate of
interest.-.45-
In the standard textbook version of this theory, the firm faces a
downward sloping marginal efficiency of capital schedule and a horizontal rate
of interest line. At the point where the two intersect, the firm has an
optimal stock of capital. If, however, the marginal efficiency of capital
exceeds the rate of interest, the firm has an incentive to invest. Adjustment
costs limit the speed with which the firm closes the gap but the volume of
investment can be assumed to be an increasing function of the difference
between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest.
In an economy with complex tax rules, the analog to the marginal
efficiency of capital schedule depends on the tax rate, the depreciation rules
and investment tax credits, and the rate of inflation, as well as on the
pretax profitability of the available investment projects. Each point on the
schedule represents the maximum net cost of funds that the firm can afford to
pay to support that incremental project. We represent shifts in the level of
this entire schedule by the maximum net cost of funds that the firm can afford
to pay on a hypothetical "standard" project.
More explicitly, we derive the maximum potential net return (MPNR) on the
assumption that the basic investment project is a "sandwich" of equipment and
structures that lasts for 30 years and replicates the average mixture of
equipment and structures in the capital stock of the nonfinancial corporate
sector. The sandwich consists of an initial investment of .33 dollars of
structures and .33 dollars of equipment. The output associated with the
structures -is assumed to decay exponentially at a rate of 3 percent a year;
at the end of 34 years, the remaining structure is scrapped without value.
The output associated with the equipment decays more rapidly, at 13 percent-46-
per year, and the equipment is scrapped without value at the end of 17 years.
After 17 years, a new equipment investment is made with real value (in the
prices of year 1) of $.33. This then decays in the same way as the initial
equipment investment and is scrapped at the same time as the structure.
The net output values of the structure and equipment components are set
f or the first year of each project to satisfy two conditions. First, the
overall pretax return on the investment sandwich is 10.3 percent, the average
pretax return for the period from 1961—84 (or at the pretax return of the
current year in the varying profitability model). Second, the after-tax rates
of return on the two types of capital are equal under the tax rules prevailing
in the base period (chosen to be 1960). These conditions uniquely determine a
path of net output which we shall denote x.
The MPNR is defined as the net rate of return that the firm can pay on
the funds "borrowed" (as a loan or an infusion of equity capital) to finance
an investment sandwich and have "paid off" the initially invested funds by the
end of the life of the project. More specifically, we consider a project that
has annual pretax real net output of x per dollar of plant and equipment
initially invested and nominal pretax net receipts of The price level
of the firm's net output is assumed to vary in proportion to the price level
of the economy as a whole. The firm is allowed depreciation deductions for
tax purposes of a and pays tax on nominal output less interest expenses and
depreciation allowances at rate T. The firm needs initial cash per dollar of
the equipment investment equal to one dollar minus the investment tax credit.
Thereafter, the "loan" balance (Lt) is reduced by the project's after-tax
income but grows by an annual amount equal to the product of the net cost of-.47—
funds and the previous year's "loan" liability. The value of the rate of
return on the "borrowed" funds that permits the "loan" to be just repaid when
the project ends defines the maximum potential net return.20




subject to the condition that L0 =0.66minus the investment tax credit per
dollar of equipment investment, that L11 is increased by the net cost of the
new equipment investment, and that the loan is repaid when the project is
scrapped (L1 =0).
An alternative measure of the MPNR is also calculated on the assumption
that firms assume that the real pretax return on the prospective investment
projects varies from year to year and is equal to the average pretax return
actually earned in that year on all nonfinancial corporate capital. This
measure is denoted MPNRVP (where the last two letters denote varying
profitability).
The net cost of funds -is taken to be a weighted average of the costs of
debt and equity funds. The cost of equity funds (e) is the ratio of adjusted
economic earnings per share to the price per share.21
20Note that if the project were financed by debt, the MPNR would be the
interest rate net of the tax deduction. If there are no taxes, the MPNR is the
traditional internal rate of return. The maximum potential real net return is
obtained by subtracting the expected inflation rate from the nominal MPNR value.
Annual values of MPNR and MPRNR are presented in Appendix table B-i.
211he method of doing this adjustment and the adjusted data are presented in
appendix B.The gross cost of debt is the yield on newly issued high grade corporate
bonds (i). The net cost of funds is thus:
(4.2) COF =b(1-T)i+(1-b)e
where b is the proportion of investment financed by debt. We take b to be
one-third, approximately the average value of the ratio of the market value of
debt to the replacement value of the capital stock during the period 1960 to
1984. The annual values of the cost of funds and of its components are
presented in Appendix table B-i.
An estimated relation of the net investment'-GNP ratio to the rate of






== 0.784,OWS =1.79, 1955-77
Although there were substantial revisions in the national income account
data and a number of significant improvements in the process of calculating
the MPNR and COF variables, the reestimation of this equation with data for
the quarter century beginning -in 1961 produced remarkably similar parameter
estimates:
(4.4)I/Y =-0.044+0.313(MPNR-COF)t_i +0.086UCAPt_i +0.350u_1
(0.169) (0.033) (0.286)
=0.510,OWS =1.74, 1961—84-49--
A strong test of this specification is obtained by splitting the return
over cost variable into its two components. Equation (4.5) shows that the
coefficients of the two components do have quite similar absolute values, as
implied by the initial specification.





A second type of evidence that indicates the robustness of the parameter
estimates is that very similar coefficients are obtained when the basic
specification is estimated by ordinary least squares (i.e., without the
first-order autoregressive transformation) or by first—differenc-ing the data
before estimation. In the ordinary least squares regression, the coefficient
of the return over cost variable is 0.27 with a standard error of 0.15. When
the data are first-differenced, the estimates are:
1n 1n










Splitting the sample produced less satisfactory results, with too little
information in each twelve year subperiod to permit accurate estimation of the
key parameter values:-50--









The point estimates imply that the rate of return over cost had a very small
and insignificant effect in the first subperiod but a quite powerful effect in
the second half of the sample. The coefficients of the capacity utilization
variables are much closer to each other. However, a standard F-test shows
that the coefficients in the two separate subsamples are not significantly
different from each other. The sum of squared residuals for the single
overall sample from 1961 through 1984 -is 0.000609 while the sum of the two
subsample sums of squared residuals is 0.000551; the resulting F-statistic
-is only 0.42 while the critical value at the 5 percent level with 16 and 4
degrees of freedom is 4.49. The difference in the coefficients in equations
(7a) and (7b) should therefore only be interpreted as indicating that here is
insufficient evidence in the separate subsamples to estimate separate
coefficient values.
Different lag distributions did not alter the basic estimates or improve
the explanatory power of the equation. Thus, a second order polynomial—51—
distributed lag on the coefficients of four lagged values of MPNR-COF had
coefficients that summed to 0.49 with a standard error of 0.42. Only the first
of the coefficients was larger than its standard error; it had a value of 0.33
with a standard error of 0.17. With two lagged values for MPNR—COF the
estimated equation is:






The coefficient of the second MPNR-COF variable is completely insignificant
and the coefficient of the first MPNR-COF variable is very close to the value
of 0.313 in the basic equation (4.4).
Several alternatives to the capacity utilization variable were also
considered as different ways of measuring the impact of economic activity on
-investment. The unemployment rate for adult males worked reasonably well as
an alternative to capacity utilization but provided less overall explanatory
power:
(4.9) '/' =0.034+0.443(MPNR—cOF)t1 —0.211RUM20_1 +0.447u_1 (0.190) (0.115) (0.258)
=0.427,DWS =1.66, 1961-84
When a third-degree polynomial distributed lag over four annual values of the
percentage change in nonfarm business output (with the final value—52—
unconstrained) is added to the basic specification, the capacity utilization
variable continues to have a coefficient of 0.085 (with a standard error of
0.038) while none of the distributed lag coefficients is a large as its
standard error; the sum of the distributed lag coefficients is 0.0010 with a
standard error of 0.0014.
Including a variety of additional plausible variables in the equation has
little affect on the coefficient of the return over cost variable. For
example, the coefficients of the ratio of corporate cashf low to GNP and of a
time trend are both insignificant:




R2 =0.463,DWS =1.82, 1961—84
In contrast to the MPNR variable that has been used in all of the above
equations, the MPNRVP variable assumes that firms adjust their assumed pretax
rate of return from year to year in proportion to that year's actual pretax
profitability of capital in the nonfinancial corporate sector. The standard
deviation of the rather volatile MPNRVP-COF variable is twice as high for the
period 1960 through 1984 as the standard deviation of the MPNR—COF variable.
Moreover, as equation (4.11) shows, it is statistically insignificant and,
when combined with the capacity utilization rate, it provides a much less
satisfactory explanation of the behavior of the investment-GNP ratio:




Finally, we present an equation relating the growth of the net capital
stock (i.e., the ratio of net investment to the net capital stock at the end
of the previous year) to the basic rate-of-return-over cost and capacity
utilization variables:
(4.12) =-0.068+0.482(MPNR_COF)ti +0.122UCAPt1+ i8'i-i (0.234) (0.054)
•
= 0.555,OWS =1.80, 1961-84
The coefficient of MPNR-COF is some 60 percent larger than the corresponding
coefficient in the equation for the investment—GNP ratio. Since the
investment-captial ratio is about 30 percent greater than the investment-GNP
ratio, the coefficient implies a more powerful effect of MPNR-COF on the
capital growth rate than on the investment-GNP ratio. Since a similar result
was obtained with the real net return model, this method of specifying
investment behavior deserves more careful examination in a future study.
5.CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The evidence presented in this paper confirms that tax—induced changes in
the profitability ofinvestment have had a powerful effect on the share of GNP
devoted to net investment in nonresidential fixed capital and on the rate of
growth of that net capital stock. More specifically, we have reestimated two
very simple models of aggregate investment that were previously studied in
Feldstein (1982). The present study extends the previous analysis by-54-
incorporating revised national income account estimates, by improving the
estimation of the effective tax rate and the profitability of new investments,
and by extending the sample to include the years 1978 through 1984, a period
of very substantial changes in tax rules and sharp shifts in inflation and in
the business cycle. Oespite all of these changes, the new statistical
estimates are remarkably close to the previous results.
The statistical estimates imply that each percentage point increase in
the real after-tax net return on capital in the nonfinancial corporate sector
raises the ratio of net fixed nonresidential investment to GNP by 0.4 percentage
points. Since the 22 percentage point decline in the effective tax rate paid
by corporations and their shareholders and creditors between 1978-80 (just
before the passage of the 1981 tax act) and 1983—84 (the most recent years for
which data are available) implies a 1.8 percentage point rise in the real net
return, the implied increase in the investment-GNP ratio is approximately
0.7 percentage points. Although it is inappropriate to treat the specific
implications of these models as precise predictors of the impact of taxes in
any particular short period, the predicted rise in the investment-GNP ratio
accords quite well with the observed 0.6 percentage point increase. After
taking into account the fall in capacity utilization over this same period,
the analysis shows that virtually all of the rise in the investment-GNP ratio
appears to have been do to the reduction in effective tax rates that occurred
because of the decline in inflation and in personal tax rates and to the
accelerated depreciation of investment in plant and equipment.
A separate analysis that relates the investment-GNP ratio to the
difference between the potential return on new investment and the cost of-55-
funds also shows the importance of changes in taxes as a cause of changes in
the investment-GNP ratio over the past quarter century. Each percentage point
rise in the difference between the potential return on new investment and the
cost of funds raises the predicted -investment-GNP ratio by 0.3 percentage
points. Between 1979-81 and 1984—85, the maximum potential real return on new
investment rose by 1.3 percentage points, implying a 0.4 percent of GNP rise
in investment.
Although this model is not as successful as the net return model -in
explaining year to year variations in the investment—GNP ratio in general, and
the experience between 1980 and 1985 in particular, it does imply that changes
in the return on new investment and in the cost of funds do have powerful
effects on the investment-GNP ratio. It also shows that about two-thirds of
the increase in investment that might have resulted from the improved
after-tax profitability between 1978-80 and 1984 was offset by the rise in the
cost of funds during the same period. All of this increase -in the cost of
funds was in the cost of debt. Therefore to the extent that the increase in
expected budget deficits caused the rise in interest rates, it had the effect
of offsetting a large part of the increased incentive to invest that resulted
from the change in tax rules.
The three alternative models of investment behavior all imply that the
types of tax changes proposed by the Reagan administration or passed by the
House of Representatives would significantly depress the ratio of investment
to GNP. Depending on the particular statistical specification, the
Administration proposal would reduce the investment--ONP ratio by between
20 percent and 40 percent of the increase experienced between 1979-81 (before-56-
the 1981 change in tax rules) and 1984-85. The bill passed by the House of
Representatives would reduce investment by substantially more.
A high priority now is to reestimate the analysis of this paper with the
revised national income and product account data released in December 1985.
It is also possible to extend the present analysis in a number of ways. The
relation between investment and the net return after corporate taxes but
before personal and other portfolio taxes should be analyzed further.
Additional attention should also be given to analyzing the rate of growth of
the net capital stock as well as or instead of the investment-GNP ratio. The
process of replacement and modernization investment also deserves more
explicit analysis in this framework. The flexible accelerator models of Hall
and Jorgenson (1963, 1967) and the marginal-q models of Abel (1984), Summers
(1981) and Hayashi (1982) should also be estimated.22 Finally, a
disaggregation of investment by types of assets and by industry may also
improve our understanding of the investment process and of the impact of
changes in tax rules.
Cambridge, MA
February 1986
22We have done some preliminary analysis with a variety of alternative
marginal q-models and find that a specification of marginal-q based on the
potential profitability of investment provides a better explanation of past
investment experience than the method used by Summers (1981).—57-.
Appendix A
The Pretax Rate of Return and Effective Tax Rates
This appendix presents annual data for 1953 through 1984 on the
investment rate, capacity utilization, pretax and net—of—tax rates of return,
and the effective tax rates. Our procedures for estimating these magnitudes
from data published by the Commerce Department, the Federal Reserve Board and
the Internal Revenue Service are described.
Our method follows the procedure used in Feldstein, Poterba and
Dicks-Mireaux (1983) but makes some modifications that we believe provide
better estimates of both the pretax return and effective tax rates. The
calculations use the most recent data available in the fall of 1985. This
means that the December 1985 benchmark revisions of the national income and
produce accounts and the subsequent changes adopted by the Federal Reserve
Board for the flow of funds accounts are not incorporated.
All of our estimates of the pretax rate of return and of the effective
tax rates are for nonfinancial corporations. Nonresidential fixed investment
includes all sectors of the economy. The capacity utilization measure is the
Federal Reserve Board's estimate for the manufacturing industries.
The columns of Table Al present the following annual values: (column 1)
the ratio of net investment in nonresidential fixed capital to gross national
product; (column 2) the ratio of net investment in nonresidential fixed
capital to the net stock of nonresidential fixed capital at the end of the
previous year; (column 3) the capacity utilization rate in manufacturing-58-
industry; (column 4) the pretax real rate of return on capital in the
nonfinancial corporate sector; (column 5) the real rate of return on capital
inthenonfinancial corporate sector after all taxes paid by the corporations,
their shareholders and their creditors; (column 6) the real rate of return on
capital in the nonfinancial corporate sector after all taxes paid by the
corporations; (column 7) the cyclically adjusted real rate of return on
capital in the nonfinancial corporate sector after all taxes; and (column 8)
the cyclically adjusted real rate of return on capital in the nonfinancial
corporate sector after all corporate taxes. The first two series are
calculated directly from the data published by the Commerce Department. The
data in column 3 are published by the Federal Reserve Board. The method of
calculating the remaining columns is discussed in the remainder of this
Appendix.
A.1 The Pretax Rate of Return
The pretax rate of return is calculated as the ratio of the total pretax
capital income of the nonfinancial corporate sector to the replacement value
of that capital stock including fixed capital, land and inventories. The
Federal Reserve Board's Balance Sheets for the United States, 1945-84
presents year-end values for these components. We average the end of the
previous year and the end of the current year to obtain an average value of
the capital stock during the year. These capital stock values are reported
in column 1 of Table A2.
The pretax capital income of the nonfinancial corporate sector consists














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































adjustment and inventory valuation adjustment; (2) net interest paid by the
corporations; (3) the property taxes paid to state and local governments; and
(4) the inflation-induced changes in the value of the net financial
liabilities of the nonfinancial corporations other than the liabilities to
those who are providers of capital to the corporations. Each of these will
now be explained and the time series presented in Table A2.
Corporate profits with the capital consumption adjustment and inventory
valuation adjustment are the basic data provided by the Department of Commerce
as their national income account measure of the inflation-adjusted pretax
profits. This series is presented in column 2 of Table A2.
Since we want the return to all providers of capital, we must add to
these profits the net interest payments of nonfinancial corporations. These
data are also from the national income accounts. Note that these are nominal
interest payments since any inflation—induced loss to the creditors is a gain
to the equity owners and leaves total real capital income unchanged. The net
interest payments are shown -in column 3 of the Table A2.
The Commerce Department treats state and local property taxes as a cost
of production rather than a tax on capital. We therefore add this tax to the
other components Of capital income to obtain a more correct estimate of the
return to capital. Since data are not available on the state and local
property tax paid by nonfinancial corporations, we estimate that the ratio of
these taxes to all state and local property taxes is the same as the ratio of
the fixed capital of nonfinancial corporations to the total fixed capital of
the private sector other than the nonprofit sector. This method is subject to
a variety of potential biases since it: (1) assumes that nonfinancial-60--
corporate capital and other capital are taxed at the same effective rates,
probably causing an understatement of the tax on nonfinancial corporations;
(2) ignores the tax on inventories, causing a further understatement; but (3)
ignores the tax that some states levy on consumer durables, which offsets some
of the downward bias. The estimated tax is shown in column 4 of Table A2.
The final adjustment is for the corporations' inflation-induced gains and
losses on financial assets and liabilities which are appropriately excluded
from the net capital provided to the nonfinancial corporate sector by
individuals and other portfolio investors. The net loss of the nonfinancial
corporations is equal to the inflation rate multiplied by the sum of (1) the
outstanding net trade credit (a nominal asset of the nonfinancial
corporations), (2) the federal government securities less net amounts owed to
the federal government; and (3) state and local government securities less net
amounts owed to these governments. Unfortunately, currency is not reported
and therefore cannot be included. The inflation rate is computed as the
fourth quarter to fourth quarter change in the GNP deflator and the financial
assets and liabilities are estimated as the average of the values for the end
of the year and the end of the previous year. The net gain is shown in
column 5 of Table A2.
Adding all of these together gives the total income produced by the
capital of the nonfinancial corporate sector. This is shown in column 6 of
Table A2.
Dividing the total capital income by the capital stock of column 1 yields
the pretax real return shown in column 7 of Table A2.-61-
A.2 The Effective Tax Rates
The tax on the capital income of the nonfinancial corporate sector
includes the taxes paid by the corporations themselves (to the federal
governemnt and to state and local governments )andthe taxes paid by those
who receive dividend income, interest income, and capital gains. Sincewe are
interested in deriving the overall effective tax rate on this capital income
rather than tax rates on each component, we will express eachcomponent of the
overall tax rate as a proportion of the pretax capital income shown in column
6 of Table A2. Some intermediate effective tax rates used in the calculation
are shown in Table A3.
The federal corporate tax payments as a proportion of pretax capital
income are shown in column 1 of Table A3. The corresponding state and local
corporate tax payments are shown in column 2. The state and local property
taxes discussed above and presented -in column 4 of Table A2 are expressedas a
fraction of the pretax capital income -in column 3 of Table A3. Adding
together these three columns gives the total taxes paid by the corporations
themselves as a fraction of their pretax capital income. This figure is
presented in column 4 of Table A3.
To estimate the tax on dividend income we begin by using the Flow of
Funds data on equity ownership to distribute dividendsamong classes of
investors: individuals, nonprofit organizations, insurance companies, banks,
pensions, etc. The largest class of investors is individuals whom we assume
account for 93 percent of the dividends received by the household sector. To
obtain an effective tax rate on the dividends received by individuals, we have
updated the series originally prepared by Br-inner and Brooks (1979). The-62-
effective federal dividend tax is constructed as a weighted average of
individual tax rates, using the fraction of dividends received in each year by
each income class and the corresponding statutory marginal tax rate. A state
dividend tax series is calculated using the assumption that the net marginal
tax rate on dividends is 1.5 times the average state personal tax rate implied
by the national income account aggregates. Columns 1 and 2 of Table A4 show
the effective federal and state taxes on individual dividend income; these tax
rates are expressed as percentages of dividend income. We further assume that
dividends received by nonprofit organizations, pension funds, foreign equity
owners and other miscellaneous investors are untaxed. Insurance companies and
banks pay a tax equal to 15 percent of the corporate tax rate. The
appropriate weighted average of these tax rates is the effective tax rate on
dividend income and is shown in column 3 of Table A4. Multiplying this number
by the total dividends paid by nonfinancial corporations and dividing by the
pretax capital income of those corporations yields the tax on dividends as a
proportion of pretax capital income; this component of the overall effective
tax rate on pretax capital income is shown in column 5 of Table A3.
The effective tax on capital gains also reflects the distribution of the
ownership of corporate equity and the further fact that capital gains are only
taxed when assets are sold. The distribution of equity ownership is again
based on the Flow of Funds data on the distribution of dividends among
different classes of investors and the Internal Revenue Service data on the
distribution of dividend income among different income classes. For the
sample years before 1969, individual capital gains were taxed when realized at
half the individual's statutory rate on dividends, but subject to an—63—
"alternative" maximum rate of 25 percent. For the years between 1969 and
1978, the effective tax rate on capital gains was raised in a number of ways:
the use of the alternative tax was limited, the value of the loss-offset was
reduced, the "untaxed" portion of capital gains was subject to a minimum tax,
and the amount of ordinary income eligible for the maximum tax on personal
services income was reduced in relation to the amount of the "untaxed" portion
of realized capital gains. In 1978 legislation was passed that substantially
reduced the effective tax on realized capital gains and this happened again in
1985. Throughout all of the period, the principal was maintained of taxing
capital gains only when assets are sold and permitting a step-up -in basis when
assets are transferred at death.
It is not possible to provide an accurate evaluation of the appropriate
weighted average tax rate on capital gains for every year in our sample.
Instead, we make the conservative assumption that households paid an effective
tax of only 5 percent on accruing capital gains for the years through 1968,
7.5 percent in 1969 through 1978, 5 percent in 1979 and 1980 and then
4 percent in 1981 through 1984. Banks and insurance companies are taxed at a
30 percent statutory rate on capital gains realizations. Because of the
effect of deferral, we assume that this -is equivalent to an effective 15
percent rate. We assume that all other equity holders pay no capital gains
taxes. The overall effective tax rate on capital gains is shown in column 4
of Table A4.
To translate this capital gains tax rate into taxes as a share of the
total pretax income, we must estimate the annual value of capital gains. It
is convenient to estimate two kinds of capital gains separately: the real-64-
gains and the nominal gains that result form inflation. To calculate the real
capital gains we combine the real retained earnings of nonfinancial
corporations and the real inflation-induced gain that equity owners make at
the expense of creditors. This inflation-induced gain is calculated as the
product of the rise in the price level (the increase in the GNP deflator from
the fourth quarter of the preceding year to the fourth quarter of the year in
question) and the market value of the debt of nonfinancial corporations.*
Multiplying this amount of real capital gains by the effective tax rate on
capital gains and dividing the product by the total capital income of the
nonfinancial corporate sector yields the real capital gains component of the
overall effective tax rate shown in column 6 of Table A3.
To calculate the additional nominal capital gain associated with the
nominal increase in the value of corporate assets that results from a general
rise in the price level, we abstract from the year—to-year fluctuations in
stock market values and calculate the nominal rise in the replacement value of
the capital stock.** To measure changes in the nominal value of the capital
stock, we have constructed a price index for the tangible assets of
nonfinancial corporations as a weighted average of the nonf arm business price
deflator (for inventories) and the price deflator for gross domestic fixed
investment. The fourth quarter to fourth quarter change in this price index is
multiplied by the nominal value of the tangible assets to get the nominal
*This debt series has been estimated for the nonfinancial corporate sector
and the total corporate sector and will be discussed in Feldstein and Jun (1986)
**Because of nonneutral tax rules, a change in the rate to the nominal
replacement value of the underlying assets but, with a persistent constant
rate of inflation, the nominal stock market value should rise at the same rate
as the nominal value of the underlying assets. See Feldstein (1980).-65—
increase in the value of the capital stock of the nonfinancialcorporations.
This nominal capital gain is multiplied by the effective tax rate oncapital
gains (column 4 of Table A4) to obtain the nominal capital gains component of
the overall effective tax rate shown in column 7 of Table A3.
The final component of the effective tax rate is the tax paid on the
interest received by the creditors of the nonfinancial corporations. We
understate this tax rate by ignoring the state and local taxes on interest
income. To obtain the federal effective tax rate on interest income, we
calculate a weighted average of the tax rates of the different providers of
debt capital to the nonfinancial corporations, using the fixed weights for
1976 derived from the Flow of Funds data by Feldstein and Summers (1979).t
We follow the Feldstein-Summers procedure of setting the household tax rateon
interest income at 35 percent, the mutual savings bank rate at 24 percent, and
the rate for private pensions, government accounts and "miscellaneous
creditors" at zero.In computing the marginal tax rate for life insurance
companies we have followed Warshawsky (1982) in approximating the Menge
formula by the product of the federal corporate statutory rate and and the
factor 0.15 +8,5times the the difference between the Baa corporate bond rate
and the average interest rate assumed for life insurance reserves. Finally,
for commercial banks we assume that two-thirds of the interest received is
taxed at the statutory corporate tax rate while the remaining one-third avoids
all corporate tax; the income net of corporate tax is then taxed at a weighted
average of the dividend tax rate and the capital gains tax rate with weights
tlhese weights are: individuals, 0.082; mutual savings banks, 0.055; life




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































reflecting the dividend payout rate of the banks. The combined effective tax
rate on interest income is shown -in column 5 of Table A4. The product of this
rate and the interest payments of the nonfinancial corporations divided by the
total capital income of the nonfinancial corporations gives the interest
component of the overall effective tax rate shown in column 8 of Table A3.
All of these numbers are combined in the final effective tax rate shown
in column 9 of Table A3.
As a matter of interest, we also calculate two alternative estimates of
the effective tax rate on the equity income of nonfinancial corporations. The
first of these is calculated on the assumption that the providers of debt
capital bear only the tax that is levied on interest income, i.e., the tax
shown in column 8 of table A3. The second alternative assumes that the taxes
paid by the corporations fall equally on debt and equity capital.
The first effective tax rate on equity capital income is therefore
defined as the ratio of all taxes paid other than the tax on interest income
as a fraction of all capital income other than interest payments.
Operationally, the numerator is the product of the total capital income
(column 6) of table A2 and the difference between the total effective tax rate
(column 9 of table A3) and the interest component of that tax rate (column 8
of Table A2). The denominator is the difference between the total capital
income (column 6 of Table A2) and the interest paid to creditors (column 3 of
Table A2). The resulting effective tax rate on equity income is shown in
column 6 of Table A4.
The alternative procedure is to impute to the providers of debt capital a—67-
share of the taxes pa-id by the corporations (columns 1 through 3 of TableA3)
equal to the ratio of the market value of the debt to the replacement value of
the capital stock. The numerator of the equity tax rate is thenequal to the
numerator described -in the previous paragraph minus the imputed tax paid by
creditors. The denominator is the same as before. The resulting effective
tax rate on equity income with imputed corporate taxes is shown in column 7 of
Table A4.-S8-
Appendix B
The Maximum Potential Net Return and the Cost of Funds
Table B-I presents annual values of the basic variables used in the rate
of return over cost models of section 4 and summarized and discussed in
section 2.
Column 1 shows the maximum potential net return calculated according to
the method described in section 4. The expected inflation series used in this
calculation are derived by a "rolling" estimation of an ARIMA process (using
only those data available as of each date), using the estimated coefficients
to project inflation for the next 10 years, and calculating the weighted
average of those inflation rates. These expected inflation rates are shown in
column 2 of Table Bi.
The maximum potential real net return (MPRNR) is the difference between
the MPNR value of column 1 and the expected inflation value of column 2.It
is shown in column 3.
The MPNR value is calculated assuming a constant 10.3 percent real pretax
return on capital of the nonfinancial corporations. The 'tvarying
profitability" alternative, MPNRVP, for each year is calculated with the
assumption that the future pretax profitability will be the real pretax return
on capital observed in that year and shown in column 7 of Table A-2.
Subtracting expected inflation from the MPNRVP yields the maximum potential
real net return with varying profitability (MPRNRVP) series shown in column 4
of Table Bi.
The cost of funds to which the MPNR series is compared in evaluating the-69—
incentive to invest is a weighted average of the cost of equity capital and
the net—of-tax cost of debt capital. We calculate the cost of equity capital
as the ratio of adjusted earnings to the share price. The starting point of
this calculation is the Standard and Poor's price-earnings ratio for
industrial companies. We then multiply this by the ratio of estimated
aggregate net-of-tax book earnings to estimated net aggregate economic
earnings. Net aggregate book earnings are derived from the national income
account estimate of the net profits of nonfinancial corporations before the
capital consumption adjustment and inventory valuation adjustment by adding
the sum of (1) the tax rate times the acceleration component of the capital
consumption allowance, plus (2) the difference between the investment tax
credit and an average of the ITC of the past 10 years. Aggregate economic
earnings are derived from the national income account estimate of the profits
of nonfinancial corporations after the capital consumption adjustment and
inventory valuation adjustment by adding an estimate of the gain that equity
owners make at the expense of creditors (referred to in connection with column
6 of Table A3) and the gain made on miscellaneous net liabilities (column 5 of
Table A2). The resulting adjusted earnings price ratio is presented in
column 5 of Table Bi.
The gross cost of debt funds is represented by the interest rate on
high grade corporate bonds calculated by Data Resources, Inc. This is shown
in column 6 of Table 81.
Because the MPNR and MPRNR variables are net concepts, the cost of funds
must also be measured as a net of the corporate tax deduction for interest
expenses. Column 7 is the statutory corporate tax rate against which interest—70—
expenses are deducted.
The nominal cost of funds is defined as a weighted average of the nominal
cost of equity capital (the earnings price ratio of column 5 plus the expected
inflation rate of column 2) and the nominal net cost of debt capital (the
product of the interest rate of column 6 and the one minus the corporate tax
rate of column 7) with a weight of one-third on debt and two-thirds on equity.
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